Transparency is the New Opacity: Constructing Final Regulation After the Crisis by Bradley, Caroline
University of Miami Law School
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
Articles Faculty and Deans
2011
Transparency is the New Opacity: Constructing
Final Regulation After the Crisis
Caroline Bradley
University of Miami School of Law, cbradley@law.miami.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Caroline Bradley, Transparency is the New Opacity: Constructing Final Regulation After the Crisis, 1 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 7 (2011).
ARTICLES
TRANSPARENCY IS THE NEW
OPACITY: CONSTRUCTING FINANCIAL
REGULATION AFTER THE CRISIS
CAROLINE BRADLEY t
Many of the main actors constructing financial regulation in the wake
of the global financial crisis era have a stated commitment to
transparency. However, transparency in financial regulation is
undermined because the information disclosed is simultaneously limited
and excessive. On one hand, the communications are limited:
transnational standard-setters publish their documents in a small number
of languages (or only in English). Some institutions publish the full text
of responses to consultations whereas others collate and condense
responses (sometimes in ways that the responders regard as inaccurate).
The characteristics of the bodies which respond to consultations, and
their relationships with those whose interests they claim to represent may
be visible or hidden.
On the other hand, the communications are overwhelming. Even
partial transparency is of limited usefulness to observers of financial
regulation because it is characterized by multiple complexities: financial
transactions and the rules which apply to them are complex.
Responsibility for financial regulation is shared among public and
private bodies, and among transnational, national and sub-national
entities. As a result, proposals for new rules and standards multiply
among these different entities, creating an information glut.
The inadequacy of transparency mechanisms can be remedied, for
example, by translating proposals into more languages or by providing
and requiring improved disclosure of responses and responders. But the
opacity which results from complexity is much more difficult to remedy
and more fundamental. If this problem cannot be solved, transparency
tProfessor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, PO Box 248087, Coral
Gables, FL, 33124, cbradley@law.miami.edu; http://blenderlaw.umlaw.net/. ©
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alone cannot be relied on to legitimate the new financial order.
INTRODUCTION
In this article I focus on the development of standards of financial
regulation,' and argue that transparency in financial regulation is
undermined because the information disclosed is simultaneously limited
and excessive. Transparency is limited because policy-makers who develop
the rules of financial regulation could do much more than they do to
publicize their work. Transparency is excessive because financial
regulation is complex, intersectional, multilayered, and transnational:
2
more disclosure to more people in more effective forms about more
proposals for new rules and standards adds to an information glut and
undermines the ability of citizens to understand what is happening.
Transparency, conceived of as a desirable feature of government, is not
new. Brandeis noted in 1914 that sunlight was the best disinfectant,4 and
Florida is the sunshine state not only as a matter of meteorology but also
because of its commitment to shining light on the workings of
government.5 But although policies to promote transparency are not
Thus I am focusing essentially on transparency with respect to the process by which
standards and rules are generated. This ignores other issues of transparency with
respect to financial regulation, such as transparency with respect to compliance and
enforcement, and to the costs of the regulatory system; transparency about what the
rules require (legal certainty), and the idea that many rules of financial regulation
involve requirements of transparency. See, e.g., Christine Kaufmann & Rolf H. Weber,
The Role of Transparency in Financial Regulation, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 779 (2010).
2 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL
REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO
MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM (2009) (noting the
complexity of financial regulations). Cf Sheila Jasanoff, Transparency in Public
Science: Purposes, Reasons, Limits, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 21, 24 (2006)
("[M]odem societies' increasing dependence on science has proceeded hand in hand
with developments that disable most citizens, even the most technically expert, from
effectively addressing the larger set of questions: Is it good science; what is it good for;
and is it good enough? Science has not only become infused with multiple social and
political interests; it is also in danger of escaping effective critical control. Too often
scientific knowledge seems to be 'sequestered,' concealed from those who could
benefit from it or who could comment meaningfully on its quality and relevance.").
3 See, e.g., Christopher Hood, Accountability and Transparency: Siamese Twins,
Matching Parts or Awkward Couple? 33 W. EUR. POL. 989 (2010) (explaining the
relationship between accountability and transparency).
4 Louis D. Brandeis, OTHER PEOPLES' MONEY: AND How THE BANKERS USE IT, 92
(1914) ("Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman.").
5 See, e.g., Mary K. Kraemer, Exemptions to the Sunshine Law and the Public
Records Law: Have They Impaired Open Government in Florida, 8 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
265, 266-7 (1980) (describing the enactment of the Sunshine Law in 1967). Florida has
had a Public Records Law since 1909. See, e.g., R.D. Woodson & Ricki Lewis Tannen,
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entirely novel,6 they are becoming more pervasive, more extensive, and
even more controversial than in the past.7 Technological development
encourages new modes of transparency as governments make more
information available online via databases s web pages, 9 and blogs.10
Governments promote transparency through commitments to access to
information, " and to consultation about policy.12  International
organizations encourage states to adopt policies of transparency 13 as an
Federal Constitutional Privacy and the Florida Public Records Law: Resolving the
Conflict 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 313, 328 (1981) (noting that the Florida statute of 1909 was
one of the first in the country).
6 See, e.g., Juliet Lodge, Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy 32 J. COMMON
MKT. STUDS. 330 (1994) (discussing transparency and democracy in the EU).
7 E.g., Jeannine E. Relly & Meghna Sabharwal, Perceptions of Transparency of
Government Policymaking: A Cross-national Study, 26 GOV'T INFO. Q. 148, 149
(2009) (noting increasing adoption of access to information laws over the preceding
decade); see, e.g., EU Struggles with Being Open about Transparency, EURACTfV,
(Mar. 24, 2011) http://www.euractiv.com/en/pa/eu-struggles-open-transparency-
news-503484 (noting controversy); cf Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91
IOWA L. REV. 885 (2006).
8For examples of such databases see LEGISLATION.GOV.UK,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk (last visited Aug. 21, 2011) and EUR-LEX, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2011). See also, e.g., DATA.GOV.UK:
OPENING UP GOVERNMENT, http://data.gov.uk (last visited Aug. 21, 2011); cf CABINET
OFFICE, Government ICT Strategy, 6 (Mar. 2011) available at
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/uk-govemment-
govemment-ict-strategy_0.pdf ("Information and communications technology (ICT) is
critical for the effective operation of government and the delivery of the services it
provides to citizens and businesses. It offers key benefits by enabling: access to online
transactional services, which makes life simpler and more convenient for citizens and
businesses; and channels to collaborate and share information with citizens and
business, which in turn enable the innovation of new online tools and services.").
9 Government departments and agencies have their own web pages. E.g., USA.GOV:
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL, http://www.usa.gov/ (last visited
Aug. 21, 2011); DIRECTGOV: PUBLIC SERVICES ALL IN ONE PLACE,
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/index.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2011);
REGIERUNONLNE,
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/EN/Homepage/home.html (last visited
Aug. 21, 2011) (official website of the German Government).
10 See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog (last visited
Aug. 21, 2011).
I E.g., Ben Worthy, More Open but Not More Trusted? The Effect of the Freedom of
Information Act 2000 on the United Kingdom Central Government, 23 GOVERNANCE
561, 564 (2010) (noting increasing transparency as part of the motivation for the UK's
Freedom of Information Act).
12 See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, Consultation and Legitimacy in Transnational
Standard-Setting, 20 MINN. J. INTL. L. 480, 490-1 (2011) (describing consultation as a
component of Governmental policy-making which combines ideas of transparency and
citizen involvement).
13 Whether the idea of transparency has any universal meaning is a complex question.
Cf Mark Bevir, Public Administration as Storytelling, 89 PUB. ADMIN. 183, 188 (2011)
("Our beliefs, concepts, actions, and practices are products of particular traditions or
discourses. Social concepts (and social objects), such as 'bureaucracy' or 'democracy',
2011
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aspect of good government,14 and adopt policies of transparency with
respect to their own activities as a way of enhancing their own
legitimacy.' 5 Courts approve of administrative transparency.16 Private
sector organizations from Wikileaks to foundations' 7 to newspapers 8 and
individuals' 9 also contribute to transparency of public sector actions.
do not have intrinsic properties and objective boundaries. They are artificial inventions
of particular languages and societies. Their content varies with the wider webs of belief
in which they are situated.").
14 See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., RECOMMENDATION OF THE
COUNCIL ON IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION C(95)2 1/FINAL
9 (Mar. 9, 1995), available at
http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowlnstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentlD= 1 28&Instru
mentPID=124&Lang=en&Book=False ("These questions reflect principles of good
decision-making that are used in OECD countries to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of government regulation by upgrading the legal and factual basis for
regulations, clarifying options, assisting officials in reaching better decisions,
establishing more orderly and predictable decision processes, identifying existing
regulations that are outdated or unnecessary, and making government actions more
transparent.").
15 See, e.g., IMF, TRANSPARENCY IS KEY TO ACCOUNTABILITY (Jan. 11, 2010),
available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/cs/news/2010/cso110.htm ("Greater
transparency in the IMF's policies and decisions makes it more accountable to the
people and governments at the center of its work, the organization concluded after a
policy review"); IMF, Review of the Fund's Transparency Policy-Background (Oct.
27, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/102609a.pdf
(reporting on the IMF's outreach to external stakeholders and analyzing the IMF's
transparency policy); Interinstitutional Agreements: Agreement Between the European
Parliament and the European Commission on the Establishment of a Transparency
Register for Organisations and Self-employed Individuals Engaged in EU Policy-
Making and Policy Implementation, 2011 OJ (L 191) 29-32 (Jul. 22, 2011)
(establishing a Transparency Register for the registration and monitoring of
organizations and individuals engaged in EU policy-making and implementation).
16 See, e.g., Hazelhurst v. Solicitors Regulation Authority [2011] EWHC (Admin)
462, [38] ("It is of note that the SDT has not published Indicative Sanctions Guidance.
Such guidance identifies the purpose, parameters and range of sanctions. It permits
those who appear before it to better understand the proceedings and the thinking of the
SDT. It assists the transparency of the proceedings. Such guidance has been used by
other regulatory bodies for some years and is a valuable reference point both for the
tribunal and for those who appear in front of it, as practitioners or advocates.").
17 For an example of such a foundation, see SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION,
http://sunlightfoundation.com/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2011).
18 Consider, for example the Guardian's use of crowd-sourcing with respect to data
on MP expense claims. E.g., Michael Andersen, Four Crowdsourcing Lessons from the
Guardian's (Spectacular) Expenses-Scandal Experiment, NIEMAN JOURNALISM LAB
(Jun. 23, 2009), http://www.niemanlab.org/2009/06/four-crowdsourcing-lessons-from-
the-guardians-spectacular-expenses-scandal-experiment/print; Simon Rogers, How to
Crowdsource MPs' Expenses, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 18, 2009, 3:34 PM)
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2009/jun/18/mps-expenses-
houseofcommons.
19 See, e.g., About, OPENREGS, http://openregs.com/about (last visited August 20,
2011) ("OpenRegs.com is an alternative to the federal government's Regulations.gov
regulatory dockets database. That site can be confusing and difficult to use for average
citizens and experts alike. The goal of OpenRegs.com is to make the proposed and final
Vol. 1:1
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During the financial crisis market participants discovered that
governmental decisions about whether or not to rescue financial institutions
in trouble were unpredictable. For example, commentators have criticized
decisions of the US Government in September 2008 as undermining
confidence in the financial markets.20 Whereas the US Government
allowed Lehman Brothers to go into Chapter 11,21 it rescued AIG.
22
Opaque financial transactions contributed to the market participants' lack
of confidence in their ability to value assets. 23 Apparent transfers of risk
regulations published in the Federal Register easy to find and discuss, so that citizens
can become better informed and more involved in the regulatory process.").
20 See, e.g., U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT, xxi (2011), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf ("[T]he
government's inconsistent handling of major financial institutions during the crisis-
the decision to rescue Bear Steams and then to place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into
conservatorship, followed by its decision not to save Lehman Brothers and then to save
AIG-increased uncertainty and panic in the market."); Fin. Stability Bd., Consultative
Document: Effective Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions, 7 (Jul.
19, 2011) available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 110719.pdf ("The disorderly
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 provided a sharp and painful lesson of
the costs to the financial system and the global economy of the absence of powers and
tools for dealing with the failure of a SIFI. Lehman Brothers was the last SIFI allowed
to fail during the last financial crisis. All other SIFIs at risk were supported by public
capital injections, asset or liability guarantees, or exceptional liquidity measures
undertaken by central banks. While this was necessary for economic and financial
stability reasons, public bail-outs placed taxpayer funds at unacceptable risks and has
increased moral hazard in a very significant way.").
21 See, e.g., David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV.187, 187
(2010) ("Treasury . .. issued death sentences against other financial institutions,
including Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual .... ).
22 See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON MARKETS,
AND THE GOVERNMENT'S EXIT STRATEGY, 195 (Jun. 10, 2010) ("By providing a
complete bailout that called for no shared sacrifice among AIG and its creditors,
FRBNY and Treasury fundamentally changed the rules of America's financial
marketplace.").
23 E.g., Int'l Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Sovereigns, Funding,
and Systemic Liquidity, at 59 (Oct. 2010), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/gfsr/20l0/02/pdf/text.pdf (stating that the
"complex and opaque nature of securitized products made valuation difficult"); see
e.g., Fin. Stability Bd., Thematic Review on Risk Disclosure Practices: Peer Review
Report, at 2 (Mar. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r110318.pdf ("The financial crisis
highlighted that reliable and relevant valuations and disclosures of the risks to which
financial institutions are exposed are important to maintain overall market confidence.
High quality risk disclosures contribute to financial stability by providing investors and
other market participants with a better understanding of firms' risk exposures and risk
management practices."); cf TREASURY COMMITTEE, FINANCIAL STABILITY AND
TRANSPARENCY, 2007-8, H.C. 371, at 3 (U.K.) available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/371/371.pdf
("It is clear that the search for yield and short-termism encouraged many investors to
invest in high-yielding and increasingly complex products that it turns out they did not
always fully understand.").
2011
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turned out not to be real.24
As a result, many changes and proposed changes to rules of financial
regulation in the wake of the crisis have sought to improve transparency.
25
For example, new rules require credit rating agencies to disclose
characteristics of the models they use in developing ratings. 26 Policy-
makers have focused on establishing banking regimes that will allow banks
to fail, improving market discipline, and reducing moral hazard. 7
Many of the main actors constructing financial regulation in the wake of
the global financial crisis era have stated commitments to transparency.
The members of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) agreed to subject
themselves to peer reviews of their implementation of transnational
standards of financial regulation, 28 and the FSB publishes the reviews.
29
24See, e.g. INT'L MONETARY FUND, Global Financial Stability Report: Containing
Systemic Risks and Restoring Financial Soundness, at xii (April 2008), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/01/pdf/text.pdf ("[A] surprising amount
of risk has returned to the banking system from where it was allegedly dispersed.").
21 See Donald C. Langevoort, Global Securities Regulation after the Financial Crisis,
13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 799, 805 (2010) (pointing out that whereas transparency may be
critical for securities regulation it may not be so critical for risk regulation, stating
"Separation between the domains of securities regulation and substantive risk
regulation also has a second, more normative value. Put simply, those two domains are
inherently at odds, and whenever combined under one roof, securities regulation tends
to lose. Securities regulation is about truth-telling, and under stressful conditions, risk
regulators almost always prefer concealing the truth to exposing it. To be sure, it is far
from clear that truth-telling is always the right course, but preserving a regulatory
capacity that favors transparency is generally preferable to folding it into the risk
regulator's task with some vague mandate to value disclosure.").
26 See, e.g., Council Regulation 1060/2009, art. 8, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 1, 12 (providing
that a "credit rating agency shall disclose to the public the methodologies, models and
key rating assumptions it uses in its credit rating activities").
21 See, e.g., Commission Communication on An EU Framework for Crisis
Management in the Financial Sector, at 2, COM (2010) 579 final (Oct. 20, 2010)
available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemal market/bank/docs/crisis-
management/framework/com2010 579 en.pdf ("Banks must be allowed to fail, like
any other business. Authorities must be equipped with tools that enable them to prevent
the systemic damage caused by disorderly failure of such institutions, without
unnecessarily exposing taxpayer to risk of loss and causing wider economic damage.
Alongside tougher regulation reducing the chances of a bank becoming distressed, a
credible regime is needed to re-instill market discipline associated with the threat of
failure and to reduce moral hazard-the implicit protection from failure that those in
the banking sector currently enjoy.").
28 Fin. Stability Bd., FSB Framework for Strengthening Adherence to International
Standards, at 1-2 (Jan. 9, 2010), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 1001 09a.pdf (stating the
commitment of FSB Member States to undergo peer review "to evaluate their
adherence to international standards in the regulatory and supervisory area").
29 For an example of a published peer review see Fin. Stability Bd., Country Review
of Mexico: Peer Review Report (Sep. 23, 2010) available at
http://www.fmancialstabilityboard.org/publications/r100927.pdf [hereinafter Mexico
Country Review] and Fin. Stability Bd., Peer Review of Italy: Review Report (Jan. 27,
2011) available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/rl 10207b.pdf
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The Basel Committee now publishes consultative documents online3 ° and
has even published some responses to consultation. 31 The White House has
32adopted a policy of transparency and open government. Open government
includes moves to make government datasets, including those relating to
spending, more visible.33 It also involves efforts to make the regulatory
process more transparent.34 Administrative agencies have invited the public
to make comments about how they should go about making rules, rather
than merely responding to specific regulatory proposals.3 5 All of these
initiatives are facilitated by developments in information technology.
[hereinafter Italy Peer Review].
30 See, e.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Press Release, Pillar 3
Disclosure Requirements on Remuneration - Consultative Document (Dec. 27, 2010),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl91.htm ("The Basel Committee welcomes
comments on this consultative document. Comments should be submitted by Friday, 25
February 2011 by email to: baselcommittee@bis.org. Alternatively, comments may be
sent by post to the Secretariat of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank
for International Settlements, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland. All comments may be
published on the Bank for International Settlements' website unless a commenter
specifically requests confidential treatment.").
31 See, e.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Comments Received on the
Consultative Documents "Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector" and
"International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and
Monitoring," available at http://www.bis.org/pubb/bcbs165/cacomments.htm (last
visited Aug. 24, 2011) (listing and linking to comments received on consultation
documents).
32 See, e.g., Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009) (announcing a
new policy of transparency and open government); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXEC. Office of the President, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies, Open Government Directive (Dec. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda 2010/m 10-
06.pdf (discussing how a move towards e-government, which is a component of open
government, antedated the Obama Administration); see also, The E-Government Act of
2002, Pub. L. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3601) (2002))
(promoting the use of electronic government services). But see, Daniel Schuman,
Budget Technopocalypse: Proposed Congressional Budgets Slash Funding for Data
Transparency, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION BLOG (Mar. 23, 2011),
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2011/03/23/transparency-technopocalypse-
proposed-congressional-budgets-slash-funding-for-data-transparency/ (noting that as of
March 2011 future funding for these programs is uncertain).
33 See, e.g., DATA.GOV, http://www.data.gov/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); FOIA.GOV,
http://www.foia.gov (last visited Sept. 9, 2011) (providing information about how to
acquire more information from the government).
34 E.g., REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011)
(facilitating access to and participation in the federal regulatory process).
35 See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Chairman Schapiro Announces Open Process
for Regulatory Reform Rulemaking (Jul. 27, 2010)
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-135.htm ("Under a new process, the public
will be able to comment before the agency even proposes its regulatory reform rules
and amendments.... The new process goes well beyond what is legally required and
will provide expanded opportunity for public comment and greater transparency and
accountability. The SEC also expects to hold public hearings on selected topics.").
2011
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This is a very brief and incomplete description of the ways in which
governments and supranational organizations have worked towards
transparency. However, it illustrates that transparency is an important
element of the way in which policy-making bodies conceive of and
describe their roles. Nevertheless, transparency may not achieve effective
communication. 
3 6
FINANCIAL REGULATION AND TRANSPARENCY
In many ways domestic initiatives to reform or adjust financial
regulation are transparent in the same way as any other domestic changes
in the law. The activities of legislative bodies are visible via the internet
37
and television,38 and sometimes by video over the internet, 39 and are also
reported on by the news media. Regulators publish proposed regulations for
public comment. 40 But despite policy-makers' efforts to make information
36 See, e.g., Onora O'Neill, Ethics for Communication? 17 EUR. J. PHIL.167, 170
(2009) ("It is all too common for material that is publicly disclosed or disseminated,
thereby achieving transparency, not to be read, heard or seen by any or many
audiences; even where it is read, heard or seen, it may not to be grasped or understood
by those audiences. Transparency counters secrecy, but it does not ensure
communication ... Sometimes it is even used to maintain secrecy: one effective way to
ensure that information is not communicated is not to keep it secret, but to 'release' it
with no fanfare.").
3' E.g., U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.gov/ (last visited Sept.
9, 2011) (providing access to information about proceedings in the US House of
Representatives); U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011)
(providing access to information about proceedings in the US Senate); State Legislative
Websites Directory, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=17173 (last visited Sept. 9, 2011) (providing links to
websites of state legislatures in the US); ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE,
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/index.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2011) (providing
access to information about proceedings in the French Assemblde Nationale); U.K.
PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011) (providing access
to information about proceedings in the UK Parliament).
38 See, e.g., Timothy E. Cook, House Members as Newsmakers: The Effects of
Televising Congress, 11 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 203 (1986) (discussing the impact of
televising Congress).
39 E.g., Parliamentary Television of the German Bundestag, GERMAN BUNDESTAG,
http://www.bundestag.de/htdocse/press/tv/index.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2011)
(providing access to live and recorded video of proceedings in the German Bundestag);
see legislative websites cited supra note 37 (providing access to live and recorded
video of legislative proceedings).
40 E.g., REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!aboutProgram (last
visited Sept. 9, 2011) (noting that "Federal regulations have been available for public
comment for many years, but people used to have to visit a government reading room
to provide comments. Today, the public can share opinions from anywhere on
Regulations.gov."); see also, e.g., Harold C. Relyea, The Federal Register: Origins,
Formulation, Realization, and Heritage, 28 GOV'T INFO. Q. 295 (2011) (describing the
introduction of the Federal Register); cf Erwin N. Griswold, Government in Ignorance
of the Law - A Plea for Better Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV.
198, 208 (1934) ("[A]part from the United States, it would be very difficult to find a
Vol. 1:1
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about what they are doing available to the public, the public is often not
well-informed about the law or proposals for its reform.4'
One reason citizens may be under-informed about law and policy is that
some policy issues seem, as a general matter, less salient to them than
others. Scandals and crises can increase salience, 42 but many areas of
financial regulation are less salient for citizens, even at times of financial
scandal or crisis. 43 Policy networks and entrepreneurs influence the
development of regulation by taking advantage of opportunities to promote
their own preferred policy ideas.44
nation of importance which does not use some method to make available and accessible
a record of the acts of its executive authorities.").
41 See, e.g., Howard Schuman & Stanley Presser, Public Opinion and Public
Ignorance: The Fine Line Between Attitudes and Nonattitudes, 85 AM. J. Soc. 1214
(1980) (analyzing people's willingness to express views on issues they do not know
about).
42 Cf Michael D. Jones & Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Trans-Subsystem Dynamics:
Policy Topography, Mass Opinion, and Policy Change, 37 POLICY STUD. J. 37, 42
(2009) ("Salience disruption is initiated by large-scale events that focus public attention
on specific subsystems (or groups of them) and thereby generates enormous effort,
resources, and change in those subsystems, while simultaneously drawing attention and
resources away from others.").
43 For example, in 2010 the Securities and Exchange Commission published
proposed rules on an end-user exception to the mandatory clearing of security-based
swaps. See End-User Exception to Mandatory Clearing of Security Based Swaps, 75
Fed. Reg. 79,992 (proposed Dec. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). The
SEC received sixteen comments on this proposal. See Comments on Proposed Rule:
End-User Exception to Mandatory Clearing of Security-Based Swaps, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-43-10/s74310.shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
But see Debit Interchange Rule Delayed, WOLTERS KLUWER FIN. REFORM NEWS CTR.
(Mar. 31, 2011, 4:11 PM), http://financialreform.wolterskluwerlb.com/2011/03/debit-
interchange-rule-delayed.html (noting more than 11,000 comments on a proposed rule).
44 The corporate governance community promotes changes in governance as a
solution to a range of issues. For example, proposals to change banking regulation now
include changes to corporate governance requirements for banks. See, e.g., European
Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the Access to the Activity of Credit
Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms
and Amending Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions, Insurance Undertakings and
Investment Firms in a Financial Conglomerate, at 3, COM (2011) 453 final (Jul. 20,
2011) ("The collapse of financial markets in autumn 2008 and the credit crunch that
followed can be attributed to multiple, often inter-related, factors at both macro- and
micro-economic levels, as identified in the Report of the High-Level Group on
Financial Supervision in the EU published on 25 February 2009, and in particular to the
accumulation of excessive risk in the financial system. This excessive accumulation of
risk was in part due to the weaknesses in corporate governance of financial institutions,
especially in banks. Whilst not all banks suffered from systemic weaknesses of
governance arrangements, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
referred to 'a number of corporate governance failures and lapses."'). Cf Diane Stone,
Private Philanthropy or Policy Transfer? The Transnational Norms of the Open
Society Institute, 38 POL'Y AND POL. 269, 272 (2010) ("[E]ite forms of associational
life .... professional bodies with substantial financial resources or patronage (and
sometimes interlock) .... are aimed at influencing policy and engaged in transferring
2011
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How policy issues are characterized may affect how salient those issues
are: issue characterization is key. Policy-makers who characterize issues
relating to sub-prime lending as "predatory lending" may engage more
citizens in discussions about proposals to change the law than if they used
some other more neutral characterization. 45  Narratives help with
characterization: different versions of sub-prime lending narratives would
suggest different regulatory responses. If the sub-prime lending problems
were caused by inadequate risk management at financial firms, the
appropriate regulatory solution would focus on encouraging or requiring
financial firms to adopt improved risk management strategies and to
engage in responsible lending. If the problems were caused by borrowers
who enthusiastically took on "liar loans" they could not afford, the
appropriate solution would encourage responsible borrowing.46
Statutes and regulations are frequently written in very technical language
and one way of improving the transparency of law is to write the law, and
proposals to change the law, in language citizens are able to understand.47
Policy-makers may draft plain language regulations and explanatory
documents in simple language to improve communication with citizens.
But moving from complex technical language to plainer language takes
time,48 and even where explanations of financial rules are expressed in
plain language the rules are often complex,49 and the activities they would
experts and policy ideas between countries and professional communities.").
45 Cf Anne Schneider & Mara Sidney, What Is Next for Policy Design and Social
Construction Theory?, 37 POL'Y STUD. J. 103, 106 (2009) ("The policy design
approach directs scholars to examine who constructs policy issues, and how they do so,
such that policy actors and the public accept particular understandings as 'real,' and
how constructions of groups, problems and knowledge then manifest themselves and
become institutionalized into policy designs, which subsequently reinforce and
disseminate these constructions.").
46 The EU has attempted to compromise with proposals which focus on
"irresponsible lending and borrowing." See Commission Proposal for a Directive on
Credit Agreements Relating to Residential Property, at 2 COM (2011) 142 final (Mar.
31,2011).
47 E.g., Plain Writing Act of 2010, 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); see, e.g.,
Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011)
("Our regulatory system must ... ensure that regulations are accessible, consistent,
written in plain language, and easy to understand.").
48 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., PLAIN WRITING IMPLEMENTATION PLAN - JUNE 2011
(2011), http://www.fdic.gov/plainlanguage/implementationplan.html (pointing out that
the FDIC published its implementation plan in June 2011).
49 See Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of England, Speech at the
American Economic Association, Denver, Colo.: Capital Discipline (Jan. 9, 2011),
available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/201 1/speech484.pdf
(suggesting that simple rules might be appropriate for complex activities, stating "As a
thought experiment, imagine instead we were designing a regulatory framework from
scratch. Finance is a classic complex, adaptive system. What properties would a
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control are also complex. This layering of complexities produces and
intensifies opacity.
Financial regulation is increasingly a transnational, rather than a merely
domestic, phenomenon. For many years, regulators have worked with their
counterparts in other jurisdictions to develop standards for financial
regulation.5 ° Securities regulators have worked together in the International
Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 5" insurance supervisors
work through the International Association of Insurance Supervisors
(IAIS),52 and central banks and bank regulators form the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision.13 These groups are essentially collaborative,
technocratic networks of regulators with the power to develop
recommendations, principles and standards which are not, as a formal
matter, legally binding. However, although the principles and standards are
not legally binding as such, states whose regulators participate in their
articulation may feel obliged to implement them domestically. And states
which depend on the IMF's 54 financial resources will be subject to the
IMF's examination of their economies, including their bank regulatory
systems.55 The global financial crisis has increased demand for funds from
the IMF.56 The IMF's interest in monitoring the financial soundness of its
complex, adaptive system such as finance ideally exhibit to best insure about future
crises? Simplicity is one. There is a key lesson, here, from the literature on complex
systems. Faced with complexity, the temptation is to seek complex control devices. In
fact, complex systems typically call for simple control rules. To do otherwise simply
compounds system complexity with control complexity.").
50 See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, 36 (2004) (describing
regulators as "the new diplomats.").
"' The International Organization of Securities Commissions, OICU-IOSCO,
http://www.iosco.org/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011).
52 International Association of Insurance Supervisors, AIS, http://www.iaisweb.org
(last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
5' About BIS, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm (last
visited Sept. 9, 2011).
54 See generally, IMF, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2011)
(explaining that the IMF is a treaty-based international organization which was founded
in 1944 to govern the international monetary system to assure exchange rate stability
and encourage IMF members to do away with exchange restrictions).
" See, e.g., Int'l Monetary Fund, Iceland: Financial System Stability Assessment
Update, IMF Country Report No. 08/368 (Aug. 19, 2008), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/crO8368.pdf (evaluating Iceland's
financial system including financial supervision and regulation).
56 See, e.g., Christine Lagarde, Managing Dir., IMF, Speech at the Council on
Foreign Relations: Challenges and Opportunities for the World Economy and the IMF
(Jul. 26, 2011), available at http://wwwvv.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2011/072611 .htm
("Over the last few years, the IMF's role has grown tremendously. It was an intellectual
leader during the crisis, with its early call for coordinated policy stimulus. It has been a
flexible financial partner, reforming its lending instruments and making available a
record amount of support, totaling about $330 billion. And it is helping build a stronger
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members, especially of its borrowers, gives it an interest in regulation as a
mechanism for promoting financial stability. 57 In response to criticism, the
IMF has recently been working to address some of the concerns about its
role by emphasizing transparency as an accountability mechanism.5 8
Transnational standard-setters have incentives to be transparent about
their work partly because regulated firms wish to express their views on
proposed standards, and partly in order to legitimize their work to critics.
Although the Basel Committee has not clearly articulated its views about
transparency and consultation, LOSCO has done so. In 2005 IOSCO
published a document describing its policies with respect to public
consultation.5 9 The document described IOSCO's objectives in carrying out
public consultations as including benefiting from "the expertise of the
international financial community," promoting "understanding of IOSCO's
mission as the international standard setter for securities markets" and
continuing to increase transparency about IOSCO's work.60
The Basel Committee and IOSCO, as networks of regulators, co-operate
across territorial boundaries to address systemic problems and to be more
effective domestically. But their activities have an impact on the
competitiveness of financial firms. Financial firms which are subject to
relaxed regulation in their home state may benefit from a competitive
advantage with respect to firms based in jurisdictions with more demanding
regulatory regimes. Governmental support for financial firms may function
as a subsidy. The original Basel Accord which was introduced in 1988
provided for states to impose capital adequacy requirements on
international banks, even if those states addressed risks to financial stability
in other ways (such as through governmental guarantees). The Accord was
agreed to after the US and the UK announced they would apply stringent
capital adequacy requirements to foreign banks doing business in their
global economy, through its policy advice and technical assistance efforts."). But cf
Harold James, International Order After the Financial Crisis, 87 INT'L AFFAIRS 525,
535 (2011) ("The China-America dispute has shown the essential helplessness of the
IMF, an institution which had been trying desperately to reassert its usefulness in the
course of the global financial crisis.").
57 See, e.g., Jose VINALS ET AL., IMF STAFF POSITION NOTE: SHAPING THE NEW
FINANCIAL SYSTEM, 6 (2010) available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1015.pdf ("The IMF, for its part, also
has a unique role to play, given its universal membership, its macro-financial mandate,
and its well-established roles in the area of bilateral and multilateral surveillance and
technical assistance.").
58 See, e.g., IMF, TRANSPARENCY IS KEY TO ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 15.
" Exec. Comm. of the Int'l Org. of Sec. Comm'ns, IOSCO Consultation Policy and
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jurisdictions.61
The story of the genesis of the original Basel Accord illustrates that the
interests of private firms have an impact on regulation at the transnational
level as well as at the domestic level. The multi-level governance model of
regulation focuses on the idea of levels of regulation, but financial
regulation involves not just levels of regulation but multiple intersections
between different spheres of regulation: intersections between
governmental and non-governmental or private spheres; between the
spheres of expertise and of politics; and between the domestic and foreign
or international spheres. These spheres are interconnected. Governmental
authorities work together across territorial borders. There is some overlap
between the private sphere and the sphere of expertise, and the market-
based sphere of expertise is transnational, rather than being entirely
domestic. The intricacies of the interconnections between the different
spheres of financial regulation form an additional layer of opacity over the
complexities of the markets and transactions which occur on those markets.
Thus financial regulation involves complex activities and markets, intricate
and diffuse processes for assessing and deciding on rules and standards,
and many complicated rules.
Before the crisis, financial firms had considerable success in persuading
governments and the networks of regulators to defer to a large extent to the
expertise of the private sector. IOSCO said that the "regulatory regime
should make appropriate use of Self-Regulatory Organizations."62 When
the crisis hit, the idea of self-regulation seemed suddenly less attractive.
For example, in late 2008 Christopher Cox, then Chairman of the SEC, said
that it had become "abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not
work., 63 The language of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles was
61 See e.g., Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International Financial
Regulation, 49 HARV. INT'L L. J. 447, 500-503 (2008) (describing the background to
the adoption of the 1988 Basel Accord).
62 Int'l Org. of Sec. Comm'ns, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, at
12, (Feb. 2008), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD265.pdf.
63 Press Release, Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Chairman Cox Announces End
of Consolidated Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008)
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.htm. Compare Commission Guidance
and Amendment to the Rules Relating to Organization and Program Management
Concerning Proposed Rule Changes Filed by Self-Regulatory Organizations, Release
No. 34-58092, 73 Fed. Reg. 40144, 40144 (Jul. 11, 2008) (reflecting the SEC's reliance
on self-regulation, expanding the range of SRO rule changes which would become
immediately effective and stating that "Self-regulation, with oversight by the
Commission, is a basic premise of the Exchange Act."), with SEC, OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF AUDITS, SEC'S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND
RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED-SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM 81 (2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/2008/446-a.pdf (noting defects in
the SEC's voluntary Consolidated Supervised Entity program).
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amended to reflect this new nervousness about self-regulation-the 2010
version backtracks from the earlier exhortation to make appropriate use of
self-regulation and merely refers to the possibility that the regulatory
system will involve self-regulation.
64
In another example of public reliance on private regulation, Basel II
allowed regulators to permit sophisticated banks to use their own models
for credit risk. Adair Turner has argued forcefully since the crisis began
that everyone put too much faith in these models: "Mathematical
sophistication ended up not containing risk, but providing false assurance
that other prima facie indicators of increasing risk (e.g. rapid credit
extension and balance sheet growth) could be safely ignored. 65
The crisis disturbed the complacency with which policy-makers viewed
self-regulation in the financial markets. But the private sector reacted by
developing new self-regulatory principles and practices. Industry groups
have focused on the securitization process, for example by developing
guidelines for limiting reliance on credit ratings,66 and addressing issues of
transparency.67 The International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA), has developed protocols for novations of credit derivatives and
interest rate transactions to address backlogs.68
Industry groups have actively negotiated and lobbied over changes to the
financial regulatory structure and rules. They have done so with the
knowledge that circumstances have changed, and earlier habits of
deference to industry views have been disrupted.69 For example, the
64 Int'l Org. of Sec. Comm'ns, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation
(June 2010), available athttp://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf.
65 FIN. SERV. AuTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE
GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 22 (Mar. 2009), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turnerreview.pdf [hereinafter Turner Review].
66 EUROPEAN FUND & ASSET MGMT. Ass'N, EUROPEAN SECURITISATION FORUM &
INV. MGMT. ASS'N, ASSET MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY GUIDELINES TO ADDRESS OVER-
RELIANCE UPON RATINGS 4 (Dec. 11, 2008).
67 E.g., EUROPEAN SECURITISATION FORUM & INT'L CAPITAL MKT. ASS'N, INDUSTRY
INITIATIVES TO INCREASE TRANSPARENCY: ISSUER AND INVESTOR TRANSPARENCYINITIATIVES
(June 2008), available at
http://www.europeansecuritisation.com/Communications/Archive/Current/Issuer/20a
nd%201nvestor/o20Transparency%/20lnitiatives.pdf (describing industry initiatives to
promote transparency in securitization transactions).
68 ISDA NOVATION PROTOCOL, INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVE ASS'N,
http://www.isda.org/isdanovationprotll/isdanovationprotll.html (last visited October
17, 2011).
69 Cf Nout Wellink, Chairman, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, President, De
Nederlandsche Bank, Remarks at the FSI High-Level Meeting on the New Framework
to Strengthen Financial Stability and Regulatory Priorities: Basel III: a Roadmap to
Better Banking Regulation and Supervision, 3, (May 24, 2011),
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110524.pdf ("We have come a long way from light
touch regulation to what some like to call 'intrusive' supervision. And this means that
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Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), a trade
group formed after the merger of the Securities Industry Association and
the Bond Market Association, submitted a 71-page response to the SEC's
proposals for new regulations on issues of asset backed securities. 70 The
response included this passage: "SIFMA's members have directly
experienced the pain of the recent financial crisis and the collapse of the
structured finance markets, and are acutely sensitive to what is at stake as
both government and the private sector work to rebuild these vital markets.
There is a long way to go."
71
The development of financial regulation involves conversations and
negotiations between market participants and the networks of regulators
which develop standards for their behavior. These processes of
conversation and negotiation take place across territorial borders, 72 and are
reasonably transparent to regulators and market participants, but they are
much less transparent to citizens. Many believe that it is entirely
appropriate for business regulation to be constructed within expert policy
networks, 3 and it is difficult to imagine how financial regulation (complex
as it is) could be made entirely transparent to non-expert citizens. But
politicians and regulators do make grand claims to be transparent, and these
grand claims make deficits in transparency problematic. 74 Politicians and
regulators do not tend to make fine distinctions in their discussions of the
role and modalities of transparency in different policy contexts. Perhaps
they should.75
supervisors sometimes need to take actions that are unpopular with individual banks or
with prevailing public opinions.").
70 Letter from Richard A. Dorfman & Timothy W. Cameron, Esq., Managing Dirs.,
Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, to SEC (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=914.
711d. at 1.
72 See, e.g., Eric Helleiner & Stefano Pagliari, The End of an Era in International
Financial Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda, 65 INT'L ORG. 169, 169-70
(2011) (discussing how transnational financial regulation is constructed).
73 E.g., Walter Mattli & Tim Balthe, Global Private Governance: Lessons From a
National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225,
230-31 (2005) (discussing the benefits of taking advantage of and maintaining
expertise, and of avoiding blame as reasons for delegating to private actors); id. at 235-
36 (noting that accounting standards are often delegated to private entities). Contra
Geoffrey R. D. Underhill & Xiaoke Zhang, Setting the Rules: Private Power, Political
Underpinnings, and Legitimacy in Global Monetary and Financial Governance, 84
INT'L AFF. 535, 536 (2008) ("The prevalence of private interests in rule-making
processes undermines the establishment of an accountable and legitimate financial
order.").
74 Cf Fenster, supra note 7, at 889 ("[T]ransparency is not merely a political norm;
candidates, partisans, and activists utilize it as a rhetorical weapon to promise full-scale
political and social redemption.").
75 Cf Robert Hoppe, Institutional Constraints and Practical Problems in
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The financial markets and the regulations that apply to them are
impenetrable for most citizens who are not involved in activities related to
the financial markets. Citizens' lack of understanding of financial matters
leads governments and international organizations to work to improve
financial literacy.76 Although citizens may need to make decisions about
their own mortgages and investment for retirement they do not need to
participate in developing rules of financial regulation. This activity remains
in the hands of the experts. But the experts are not always right about what
needs to be done, and when they are wrong it is others, including the
taxpaying citizens, who pick up the pieces.
77
The following sections of the article examine ways in which the
processes for development of transnational standards of financial regulation
are both insufficiently and excessively transparent.
CRITIQUE PART 1: INSUFFICIENT TRANSPARENCY
The Basel Committee and IOSCO both publish documents denominated
consultation documents.78 But such publication is an example of formal
rather than real transparency (or of transparency as opposed to
communication). Publication of a document on the standard-setter's web
pages does not ensure that anyone reads it. 79 Financial crises may be front
Deliberative and Participatory Policy Making, 39 POL'Y & POL. 163, 172 (2011)
(discussing "four broad categories of participatory-cum-deliberative projects").
76 E.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., IMPROVING FIN. LITERACY:
ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND POL'YS (2005) (analyzing methods for improving financial
literacy).
77 E.g., Toby Helm & Daniel Boffey, Ministers Admit Family Debt Burden Is Set to
Soar, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/201 1/apr/02/family-debt-burden-govemment-
figures/print!. The effects of financial crises may be felt far away from the markets
where they occur. See, e.g., Sophie Chauvin & Andr6 Geis, Who Has Been Affected,
How and Why? The Spillover of The Global Financial Crisis To Sub-Saharan Africa
And Ways to Recovery, Eur. Central Bank Occasional Paper Ser. No. 124, 8 (Mar.
2011) http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocpl24.pdf ("the first wave of the crisis,
characterised by the rapid spread of financial turmoil in the United States to other
developed economies and some emerging markets via their closely interconnected
financial systems, left Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of South Africa,
comparatively unscathed .... However, the second wave of the turmoil, when the
disorder in the financial sector began to have an impact on the real economy, had
profound consequences for the continent.").
78 E.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: CAPITALISATION OF BANK ExPosURES TO CENT.
COUNTERPARTIES, (Dec. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl90.pdf; TECHNICAL
COMM. OF THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'N, ISSUES RAISED BY DARK LIQUIDITY,
CONSULTATION DOCUMENT (Oct. 2010),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD336.pdf.
79 Cf Onora O'Neill, supra note 36, at 173 ("The activity by which information is
made transparent places it in the public domain, but does not guarantee that anybody
will find it, understand it or grasp its relevance.").
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page news, but the technical details of rules and standards are not. Online
newspapers do not consistently provide links to government reports and
consultation documents on transnational standards. Individuals, firms, and
organizations of firms do respond to the consultation documents, although
the responses of firms and organizations are more numerous than those of
individuals. 80 Trade associations draw their members' attention to
consultations on issues about which those members might have views.
81
When trade associations publicize consultations to their members they
draw attention to the consultations and they also show that they are
working on behalf of their members. Such publicity does help to increase
the number of people who are aware of the proposals in consultation
documents, but the people who learn about consultations from trade
associations are within the zone of expertise. Those who do are not
members of trade associations or who do not subscribe to newsletters
which track proposed new standards are less likely to find out about the
proposals. The proposals may be transparent in the sense that they are
available, but this transparency has limited impact in terms of informing
non-expert citizens about standards which may affect them.
Transnational consultations on proposed standards suffer from a further
lack of effective transparency in that they are usually conducted in a
limited number of languages, and sometimes only in English. In contrast to
the EU's commitment to multilingualism, international organizations and
standard-setters which focus on financial regulation have not been
committed from the outset to publicizing their work in multiple language
versions. This fact suggests some limits to those organizations'
commitment to effective, rather than to formal, transparency. Successful
trade associations can operate across borders and communicate in many
languages, but processes for the development of transnational standards
which are carried out solely in English, or in a limited number of other
languages, have the effect of excluding some people from participation.
This issue is being identified, if not resolved: for example, commentators
on the IMF's transparency policy suggested that the IMF should translate
more of its documents into languages other than English.82 The Bank for
80 See Comments Received on the Consultative Document "Capitalisation of Bank
Exposures to Central Counterparties, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, (Dec. 2010),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl90/cacomments.htm (showing that the Basel
Committee's listing of responses to its consultative document includes responses from
two individuals, both knowledgeable about finance and the financial markets).
81 See, e.g., Global Weekly Update March 28 - April 1, 2011, SEC. INDUS. AND FIN.
MKTS. ASS'N,
http://www.sifma.org/blastemails/Global Weekly Update/GlobalWeeklyUpdate-04-
01-11 .html (last visited Aug. 16, 2011) (noting, for example, the 14 April deadline for
comment on HMT consultation on financial reform).
82 Consultation Roundtable on IMF Transparency: Summary of Comments from Civil
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International Settlements (BIS) publishes all of its documents in English
and some in German, Spanish, French, and Italian.83 IOSCO relies more on
publication in English. At the same time, some trade associations
communicate with domestic regulators in the regulators' own languages.
ISDA has written comment letters in a range of languages from
84 85Romanian84 to Japanese.
Trade associations are frequent commentators on proposed standards of
financial regulation, but, unsurprisingly their comments are designed more
to further their own institutional interests and those of their members than
to divine truth. They seek to shape the standards, even if their comments do
not promote much in the way of public debate about the standards.
Frequently trade associations submit comments at the last minute, limiting
the ability of others to respond to assertions in their comment letters. Trade
associations may submit their comments on proposed rules and standards
late because of the pressure of work and the need to solicit and incorporate
feedback from their members rather than to make it difficult for others to
counter the content of their submissions. But late submission of comments
by influential trade associations effectively limits public discussion. Trade
associations co-ordinate their responses with each other86 and with their
members,8 7 but the behavior of trade associations is often not fully
transparent to outside observers.
The relationships between trade associations and those they represent or
Society Organizations, INT'L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/trans/2009/052809.htm.
83 Frequently Asked Questions: BIS Publications, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/about/faq.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
84 See, e.g., Letter from Peter M. Werner, Senior Dir. Int'l Swaps and Derivatives
Ass'n, to Ion Dragulin, Dir., Nat'l Bank of Romania, Fin. Stability Dep't (Mar. 28,
2011),
http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/ISDALetterNBR 25march201 lEnglishRomanian.
FINAL.pdf (commenting on Draft Amendments to Romanian Implementation of EU
Collateral Directive in both English and Romanian).
85 See, e.g., Letter from Int'l Swaps and Derivatives Ass'n, to Japanese Fin. Servs.
Agency (Oct. 11, 2011),
http://www2.isda.org/attachment/MzYzNQ==/2011.9.6 CommentLetter toFSA
2011.10.6.pdf (commenting on notice of transactions excluded from the scope of the
ricense for the Financial Instruments Obligation Assumption Service).
86 For example, the Global Financial Markets Association is an organization with
three trade associations as members: the Association for Financial Markets in Europe
(AFME), the Asia Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association (ASIFMA),
and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). See WHO IS
GFMA? GLOBAL FIN. MKTS. ASS'N, http://www.gfma.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
87 For example, trade associations establish committees to focus on particular
regulatory issues. E.g., Committees, SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKT. Ass'N,
http://www.sifma.org/about/committees/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) (listing
committees).
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claim to represent are not always transparent. Other sophisticated
organizations such as law firms may also offer expert comment on
regulatory proposals without explaining to what extent their comments are
designed to further their clients' interests. 88 Policy-makers have begun to
focus on this issue and ask organizations that respond to consultations to
explain how they decided to adopt the positions they take in their
89responses.
Another aspect of transparency with respect to the development of
standards involves the publication of responses to consultations. Different
organizations have adopted different approaches to this issue. Until
recently the Basel Committee did not publish individual comment letters on
its website. 90 IOSCO tends to characterize rather than to publish the full
text of comments it receives, 91 although it does sometimes refer to
commentators by name92 (which means that those who are interested may
88 For example, Jennifer Marshall et al., Technical details of a possible EU
ftamework for bank recovery and resolution: Response to the European Commission's
January 2011 consultation, ALLEN AND OVERY, (Mar. 3, 2011),
http://elink.allenovery.com/getFile.aspx?ItemType=Bulletin&id=f9ca8a 1 f-2199-4e27-
8cee-57e0d3b02370 is one such document. It also includes comments on the economic
cost of the proposals. Id. at 6.
89 See, e.g., Call for Evidence: Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment and Protocol thereto on Matters Specific to Aircraft 4 (U.K.), DEP'T FOR
Bus. INNOVATION AND SKILLS, (July 2010),
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/corporate/docs/c/0-1032-call-for-evidence-
mobile-aircraft-equipment.pdf ("When responding please state whether you are
responding as an individual or representing the views of an organisation. If you are
responding on behalf of an organisation, please make it clear who the organisation
represents, and how the views of your members were assembled. It would also be
useful to know whether you are a small, medium or large size enterprise.").
90 See, e.g., Comments Received on the Consultative Documents "Strengthening the
Resilience of the Banking Sector" and "International Framework for Liquidity Risk
Measurement, Standards and Monitoring", BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/publfbcbs165/cacomments.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
91 See, e.g., TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'N, HEDGE FUNDS
OVERSIGHT FINAL REPORT, 8 (Jun. 2009),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD293.pdf ("Having considered the
public comments received on the Consultation Report, the IOSCO Technical
Committee has developed the six high level principles below which should be applied
to the regulation of hedge funds."). In addition, the document has an annex reporting on
the results of the consultation and conclusions in light of responses. Id. at 17-23. In
some cases the Report refers to the responses of specific entities with attribution. See,
e.g., id. at 19 ("Considering the international dimension of the hedge funds activities,
all respondents supported the need for more convergence on the regulation of hedge
fund managers in order to minimise the risk of regulatory arbitrage and ensure better
level playing field.") (citing Intl. Council of Sec. Assn's' Pub. Response to the JOSCO
Consultation Report on Hedge Funds Oversight). But see, e.g., id. at 20 ("One
respondent challenged that the wider publication of details on business plan and fees
charged could create commercial problems for the managers.") (showing that
comments are not always attributed to particular respondents).
92 See, e.g., TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS, HEDGE
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be able to read the comments on the commentators' own web pages).
Collation and condensation of responses may make the results of a
consultation more accessible than making the full text of all responses
available, but it also risks eliding some of the subtleties in individual
responses.
In domestic regulatory regimes, the choices agencies make about how to
characterize public comments on proposed rule-makings and about what
facts revealed in comments justify regulatory action are subject to review
by courts.93 Transparency in the domestic context facilitates judicial
review. Courts may police the requirement that reasons be given for
administrative or legislative action in order to ensure effective judicial
review. 94 Transparency of domestic governmental activity may not be
perfect, 95 but it is supported by binding legal rules enforced by courts.
Transnational standard-setters such as the Basel Committee and IOSCO are
subject to no such rules. They are as transparent as they choose to be, and
there is no reliable coercive mechanism to force greater transparency upon
them.96 For example, whereas citizens can force governmental agencies to
disclose some information under freedom of information laws,97 the Basel
Committee and IOSCO are subject to no such laws. When the Basel
Committee publishes standards documents following consultations, the
documents do not clearly demonstrate reasoned connections between the
consultation process and the resulting standards. 98 The transnational
FUNDS OVERSIGHT FINAL REP., supra, note 91, at 19 (citing Intl. Council of Sec. Assn's'
Pub. Response to the IOSCO Consultation Report on Hedge Funds Oversight).
9' See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons since
1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 281-82 (1986) ("Of central importance here is the task of
ensuring that the relevant considerations, including the actual value judgments by the
agency, are disclosed to the public and subjected to general scrutiny and review.
Administrative and judicial efforts to solve this problem have come in the form of a
deliberative conception of administration, a conception that amounts to a significant
reformulation of previous understandings.").
94 See, e.g., P.P. Craig, The Common Law, Reasons and Administrative Justice, 53
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 282, 283 (1994) (discussing the common law's requirement that
agencies give reasons for their decisions).
95 E.g., Fenster, supra note 7, at 889-91 (noting Governmental invocations of
exceptions to transparency).
96 Cf Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View
from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 15, 17 (2006) ("[T]he Basel process ... demonstrates
the possibility for enhanced accountability and legitimacy in international regulation.").
97 But see Fenster, supra note 7 (noting some of the deficiencies of such laws).
98 See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: SOUND PRACTICES FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND
SUPERVISION OF OPERATIONAL RISK (Dec. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl83.pdf.
In 2011, the Committee published a final document and made comments available
online. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
PRACTICES FOR THE SOUND MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF OPERATIONAL RISK
(Jun. 2011), http://www.bis.org/publbcbsl95.pdf. However the final document does
Vol. 1: 1
TRANSPARENCY IS THE NEW OPACITY
standards process may be formally transparent in some ways, but in
important ways it is neither reliably nor effectively transparent.
CRITIQUE PART 2: EXCESSIVE TRANSPARENCY
Although in some ways citizens may find it difficult to know when
standard setters are proposing new standards and what those standards and
their implications are, at the same time, the volume of information about
standard setting published by different organizations is overwhelming.
Consumer advocates recognize that consumers' ability to make good
financial choices may be hampered by information overload, 99 and
consumers are far more likely to feel they need to make personal financial
choices than that they need to wrestle with the details of financial
regulation. Information overload tends to impede real communication about
standards.
The previous section of this article focused on transparency deficits in
transnational standard-setters, but, as noted earlier, financial regulation is
developed in multiple fora: responsibility for financial regulation is shared
among public and private bodies, and among transnational, national and
sub-national entities. Proposals for new rules and standards multiply among
these different entities, together with the responses of trade associations
and their members, creating an information glut. The financial crisis has
increased this glut, by prompting the development of new complex
standards at the transnational level as well as legislative and regulatory
action around the globe. Even organizations which represent consumer
interests have noted the volume of work caused by financial regulatory
reform. 00
Since the middle of 2010, in addition to publishing peer reviews of
regulation, 10 1 the Financial Stability Board has published short background
not refer to the comments. Comments Received on the Consultative Document "Sound
Practices for the Management and Supervision of Operational Risk", BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs183/cacomments.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
99 See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. CONSUMER PANEL, RESPONSE TO INTERIM REP. AND
CONSULTATION ON REFORM OPTIONS, 5 (Jul. 4, 2011), http://www.fs-
cp.org.uk/publications/pdf/response icb report.pdf ("Transparency in charging and
costs is essential in providing customers with a basis on which to make a choice, but
this transparency will simply result in information overload if the complexity of
charging, costs and contingent fees continue to prevail.").
'oo See, e.g., Adam Phillips, Foreword to FIN. SERV. CONSUMER PANEL ANNUAL
REPORT 2010/2011, at 4 (2011) available at http://www.fs-
cp.org.uk/publications/pdf/annualreportl 1.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2011) ("Given the
scope and size of the reforms to UK regulation it has been an arduous process to ensure
that the FCA will be an effective body that has the consumer interest at heart.").
101 See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD. supra note 28, at 2.
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notes on shadow banking 10 2 and exchange traded funds, 10 3 four progress
reports on the development of financial regulation since the crisis, 10 4 and a
consultation document on systemically important financial institutions.
10 5
In the same period the Basel Committee published consultation papers on a
countercyclical capital buffer, 0 6 on loss absorbency of regulatory
capital,10 7 on the alignment of risk and remuneration, 10 8 on deposit
insurance, 109 on operational risk, 10 on capitalization of bank exposures to
102 FIN. STABILITY BD., SHADOW BANKING: SCOPING THE ISSUES (Apr. 12, 2011),
http://www.financialstabiIityboard.org/publications/r_1 10412a.pdf.
103 FIN. STABILITY BD., POTENTIAL FIN. STABILITY ISSUES ARISING FROM RECENT
TRENDS IN EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS (ETFS) (Apr. 12, 2011),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_ 110412b.pdf
104 FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC DERIVATIVES MKT. REFORMS: PROGRESS REP. ON
IMPLEMENTATION (Apr. 15, 2011),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110415b.pdf; FIN. STABILITY
BD., PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE G20 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
STRENGTHENING FIN. STABILITY (Apr. 10, 2011),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 110415a.pdf; FIN. STABILITY BD.,
PROMOTING GLOBAL ADHERENCE TO REG. AND SUPERVISORY STANDARDS ON INT'L
COOPERATION AND INFO. EXCH.: PROGRESS REP. (Apr. 29, 2011),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r110429.pdf; FIN. STABILITY BD.
& IMF, THE FIN. CRISIS AND INFO. GAPS, IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS REP. (Jun.
2011), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 110715.pdf.
105 FIN. STABILITY BD., CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION OF
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FIN. INST., RECOMMENDATIONS AND TIMELINES (Jul. 19,
2011), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 1 10719.pdf. The Basel
Committee published a related consultation document at the same time. BASEL COMM.
ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT,
GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS: ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE
ADDITIONAL LOSS ABSORBENCY REQUIREMENT (Jul. 2011),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs201.pdf.
106 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL BUFFER PROPOSAL (Jul.
2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs 172.pdf.
'0' BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, PROPOSAL TO ENSURE THE Loss ABSORBENCY OF REG.
CAPITAL AT THE POINT OF NON-VIABILITY (Aug. 2010),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs 174.pdf.
108 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: RANGE OF METHODOLOGIES FOR RISK AND PERFORMANCE
ALIGNMENT OF REMUNERATION (Oct. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs178.pdf;
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, PILLAR 3 DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR REMUNERATION
(Dec. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs 191 .pdf.
109 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION & INT'L ASS'N OF DEPOSIT INSURERS,
BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR
EFFECTIVE DEPOSIT INS. SYS., A PROPOSED METHODOLOGY FOR COMPLIANCE
ASSESSMENT (Nov. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs I 82.pdf.
110 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: SOUND PRACTICES FOR THE MGMT. AND SUPERVISION OF
OPERATIONAL RISK (Dec. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs183.pdf; BASEL COMM.
ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT,
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central counterparties, 1 ' and on systemically important banks. 112 During
the same period, IOSCO issued a number of publications that included
documents relating to credit rating agencies,"' securitization, 14 and
systemic risk and securities regulation. 115 The EU has been busy generating
new rules and proposed rules on these topics, as have domestic legislators
and regulators. The US Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act, which was
more voluminous than the statutes which preceded it, 116 and mandated a
number of different regulatory agencies to develop many complex sets of
new rules.1 17 In the EU and the US policy-makers have focused on issues
identified by transnational bodies, such as remuneration of financial
services employees,' 18 and problems of crisis management in financial
firrns.19 Trade associations have argued that rules in force in different
jurisdictions should be consistent in order to ensure a level playing field
OPERATIONAL RISK - SUPERVISORY GUIDELINES FOR THE ADVANCED MEASUREMENT
APPROACHES (Dec. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs184.pdf
111 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, CAPITALISATION OF BANK EXPOSURES TO CENT.
COUNTERPARTIES (Dec. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs190.pdf.
112 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 105.
113 E.g., TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'N, REG.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES OF
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES. FINAL REP. (Feb. 2011),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD346.pdf.
114 E.g., TECHNICAL COMM., INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, REG.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES
OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, FINAL REP. (Feb. 2011),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/ioscopd346.pdf
115 TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, MITIGATING SYSTEMIC
RISK: A ROLE FOR SECURITIES REGULATORS, DISCUSSION PAPER, (Feb. 2011),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD347.pdf.
116 E.g., J.C. Boggs, Melissa Foxman & Kathleen Nahill, Dodd-Frank at One Year:
Growing Pains, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 52 (July 28, 2011),
http://www.hblr.org/?p = 1614.
117 See id. at 52-54 (describing the enlarging financial regulatory structure under
Dodd-Frank).
118 E.g., Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,170
(proposed Apr. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 42, 12 C.F.R. pt. 236, 12
C.F.R pt. 372, 12 C.F.R. pt 563h, 12 C.F.R. pts. 741 and 751, 17 C.F.R. pt. 248, and 12
C.F.R. pt. 1232); Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., Recommendation on Remuneration
Policies in the Financial Services Sector, SEC (2009) 580, 581 (Apr. 30, 2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/company/docs/directors-
remun/financialsector 290409en.pdf; FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CONSULTATION PAPER,
REFORMING REMUNERATION PRACTICES IN FIN. SERVS., (Mar. 2009),
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp09_10.pdf.
119 E.g., Certain Orderly Liquidation Auth. Provisions Under Title II of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Prot. Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,626 (July 15,
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380); Commission Communication on An EU
Framework for Crisis Management in the Financial Sector, supra note 27.
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and/or limit regulatory arbitrage.120 But private sector initiatives add to the
information overload. 121
Added to the difficulties associated with multiple differing proposals
emanating from different organizations is the underlying complexity of the
financial activity and of existing regulation.1 22 Complex transactions lead
to complex rules and standards and this complexity impedes transparency.
But efforts to make transnational standard-setting processes more
transparent risk making the information overload problem worse rather
than better.
Some of the participants in transnational standard-setting may have an
interest in opacity similar to the interest of lawyers who engage in
discovery abuse, but part of the excessive transparency problem derives
from the reality of different institutional actors carrying out their own
institutional missions without considering that better coordination might
improve the transparency of the process as a whole. Conceptualizing the
transparency issue as the need to make everything visible to those who
choose to look can lead to practices which are counter-productive viewed
from the perspective that useful transparency enables citizens to
understand, and not merely to find when they look. 1
23
FINAL THOUGHTS: RESOLVING TRANSPARENCY
Transparency in standard-setting suffers from two weaknesses: at the
120 See, e.g., EUR. COMM'N, OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE PUBLIC
CONSULTATION ON TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR BANK
RESOLUTION AND RECOVERY 20 (May 5, 2011),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/consultations/docs/201 I/crisis management/consult
ation overview en.pdf ("Respondents have a range of ideas on how to avoid regulatory
arbitrage and restructuring of debt: the power and circumstances under which
authorities could write down debt and the classes of bail-inable debt should be clearly
defined to prevent regulatory arbitrage; the consistency at global level to avoid
geographical relocation of debt; the interaction with the new capital rules, buffers and
capital surcharges for SIFIs should be further considered.").
121 E.g. The Conference Bd., Conference Board Task Force on Executive
Compensation 26-27 (2009), http://www.conference-
board.org/pdffree/ExecCompensation2009.pdf (describing a private sector initiative
which was developed while regulators were discussing domestic regulatory measures,
rather than a citation to a place where someone else says that private sector initiatives
add to the information overload).
122 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87
WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 212-13 (2009) (arguing that complexity in financial markets is
"the greatest financial-market challenge of the future.").
123 Cf Schneider & Sidney, supra note 45, at Ill ("Policy designs need to be
transparent rather than opaque, straightforward rather than deceptive, contain positive
constructions of all social groups and points of view even of those who are 'losing,'
logical connections between means and ends, implementation processes that grant
equal access to information and subsequent points of contestation, and arenas for
discourse that engage multiple 'ways of knowing' the issue.").
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same time there is insufficient transparency and too much. A radical
(perhaps even an essential) solution would be to focus on eliminating some
unnecessary complexities from standards of financial regulation.
24
Complexity in standards and in regulation promotes opacity, and privileges
those who have the time and resources to build expertise with respect to the
complexities. 25 But fixing the complexity of financial regulation is not at
the top of the agenda. If anything, recent initiatives in standards and
regulation only increase complexity.
Complexity is one aspect of the information overload problem. Smart
uses of technology could ameliorate other aspects of this problem. 26 The
US government has worked to improve the accessibility and manageability
of the data in the federal register system, and transnational standard-setters
(whose members are after all based in domestic systems of governance)
could learn from this and similar work. At the same time the standard-
setters should recognize this problem of excessive transparency and try to
co-ordinate with other standard-setters working on similar issues. A third
possible solution may be to try to tap into the wisdom of the crowd.
127
Crowd-sourcing has been used to track radiation levels in Japan after the
earthquake and tsunami, 128 and to pore over the details of expense claims
by Members of Parliament in the UK, 12 9 and academics propose crowd-
sourcing to improve machine translation. 30 It is one thing to note that
124 Cf Haldane, supra note 49, at 3.
125 Cf Underhill & Zhang, supra note 73, at 553 ("[T]he influence of private actors
on the input side has not only rendered public authorities dependent on the information
and expertise provided by these actors but also consistently aligned public policy
objectives with private sector preferences. This has raised fears that the enhanced rule-
setting power of private interests may have severely undermined the authority of public
actors to formulate financial and regulatory policies in line with the broader public
interest, a situation approximating policy capture.").
126 But ef Robin Gauld, Shaun Goldfinch & Simon Horsburgh, Do they want it? Do
they use it? The 'Demand-Side' of e-Government in Australia and New Zealand, 27
GOV'T INFO. Q. 177, 184 (2010) ("Much of the literature on e-govemment suffers from
an overly technological focus. It is assumed that once the correct technology is
developed and in place, and citizens given access, benefits will be delivered in terms of
reduced costs and technical efficiency, greater access and greater accountability and
transparency, the transformation of government operations, and even greater 'e-
participation' and 'e-democracy'. . . The downsides and limitations of e-government
are often downplayed or ignored altogether.").
127 But see, e.g., Dan Woods, The Myth of Crowdsourcing, FORBES.COM, (Sept. 29,
2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/28/crowdsourcing-enterprise-innovation-
technology-cio-network-jargonspy.html (critiquing crowdsourcing).
128 E.g., Steve Lohr, Online Mapping Shows Potential to Transform Relief Efforts,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2011) at B3.
129 E.g., Andersen supra note 18.
130 Vamshi Ambati, et al., Active Learning and Crowd-Sourcing for Machine
Translation, INT'L CONF. ON LANGUAGE RESOURCES AND EVALUATION 2010
PROCEEDINGS (2010), http://www.lrec-
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crowd-sourcing can effectively address some collective action issues and
another to conclude that we can rely on crowd-sourcing to manage excess
information about proposed financial standards. Making crowd-sourcing
work requires some effort to motivate and manage the crowds. 
131
There are some possible remedies for the insufficiencies in transparency
identified above, although they would be expensive. The article focuses on
three aspects of transparency insufficiency: limited translation of
consultation documents; limited information about the identity and agendas
of participants in the process; and limited information about the results of
consultations.
With respect to the first issue, the EU has half a century of experience in
managing the costs and benefits of multilingualism, although in a space
where the number of relevant languages is limited. The United Nations,
which has six official languages-Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Russian, and Spanish 132-has recently been discussing multilingualism as
an aspect of its work. 133 Resolving the tensions between allowing for full
participation by the world's citizens through multilingualism and making
decision-making affordable and efficient by limiting the number of
languages of decision is one of the critical problems of global governance,
and is an issue which implicates all areas of policy, not merely the setting
of standards of financial regulation.
The second and third sets of limitations to transparency could be
resolved by requiring improved disclosure about those who respond to
consultations and what they say. But the opacity which results from
complexity is much more difficult to remedy and more fundamental. All of
the methods this article suggests to address the insufficiencies of
transparency exacerbate problems of excessive transparency. Making more
information available to more people worsens problems of information
glut. If this problem cannot be solved, transparency alone cannot be relied
on to legitimate the new financial order.
conf.org/proceedings/lrec20 1 0/pdf/244_Paper.pdf.
131 HARVARD HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE, DISASTER RELIEF 2.0: THE FUTURE OF
INFORMATION SHARING IN HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES 8-9 (2011),
http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutions-
files.org/gpgs files/pdf/201 i/DisasterResponse.pdf.
132 Not all aspects of the UN's work involve all of these languages. E.g., U.N.
Secretary-General, Multilingualism: Rep. of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/65/488
(Oct. 4, 2010), http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N 10/566/15/PDF/N 1056615.pdf?OpenElement.
133 E.g., G.A Res. 61/266, U.N. Doc. a/RES/61/266 (Jun. 8, 2007) http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/510/33/PDF/N0651033.pdfOpenElement.
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